Scholars have wondered for a long time whether quantum mechanics (QM) subtends a quantum concept of truth, formalized by quantum logic (QL) and radically different from the classical (Tarskian) concept of truth. We show in this paper that QL can be obtained as a pragmatic structure L P QD of pragmatically decidable assertive formulas which formalizes the metalinguistic concept of empirical justification in QM. The formulas of L P QD can be seen indeed as assertions about properties of physical systems which are empirically justified or unjustified, since they can be empirically proved or disproved. This new interpretation of QL allows us to place properly QL within a general integrationist perspective, according to which nonstandard logics can be interpreted as theories of metalinguistic concepts different from truth, avoiding competition with classical notions and preserving the globality of logic. By the way, some elucidations of the standard concept of quantum truth are also obtained.
Introduction
The formal structure called quantum logic (QL) springs out in a natural way from the formalism of quantum mechanics (QM). Scholars have debated for a long time on it, wondering whether it subtends a concept of quantum truth which is typical of QM, and a huge literature exists on this topic. We limit ourselves here to quote the classical book by Jammer, (1) which provides a general review of QL from its birth to the early seventies, and the recent book by Dalla Chiara et al., (2) which contains a broad updated bibliography on this subject. Whenever the existence of a quantum concept of truth is accepted, however, one must recognize at once that it must be radically different from the classical (Tarskian) concept, since the algebraic structure characterizing QL is different from the algebraic structure characterizing classical logic (CL). Thus, a new problem arises, i.e. the problem of the "correct" logic to be adopted when reasoning in QM.
We want to show in the present paper that the above problem can be avoided by adopting an integrationist perspective, according to which non-Tarskian theories of truth can be integrated with Tarski's theory by reinterpreting them as theories of metalinguistic concepts that are different from truth. This perspective reconciliates non standard with standard logics into a broader context and can be fruitfully applied to QL. Indeed, we will prove that QL can be interpreted as a theory of the concept of empirical justification in QM.
In order to grasp intuitively our results, let us anticipate briefly some remarks that will be discussed more extensively in Sec. 2 .
First of all, it must be noted that QM usually avoids making statements about properties of individual samples of a physical system (physical objects). Rather, it is concerned with probabilities of results of measurements on physical objects (standard interpretation), or with statistical predictions about ensembles of identically prepared physical objects (statistical interpretation).
(1), (3), (4) Yet, QM also distinguishes between properties that are real (or actual ) and properties that are not real (or potential ) in a given state S of the physical system that is considered (briefly, the property E is actual in S iff it can be verified to be possessed by a physical object x in S by means of tests which do not change S). This amounts to introduce implicitly a concept of truth that also applies to statements about individuals. Indeed, asserting that a property E is actual in the state S is equivalent to asserting that the statement E(x) that attributes E to a physical object x is true for every x in the state S. Moreover, according to QM, E(x) is true, for a given x in the state S, if and only if (briefly, iff ) E is actual in the state S. It follows that E(x) is true iff it is true for every x in S (briefly, E(x) is true iff it is certainly true, or predictable, in S, which explains the notion of truth introduced in some well known approaches to QM (5) , (6) ). Falsity is then defined by considering a complementary property E ⊥ of E, so that E(x) is false for a given x in the state S iff E ⊥ is actual in S, hence iff E ⊥ (x) is true for every x in S (briefly, E(x) is false iff it is certainly false). These definitions show that the notion of truth has very peculiar features in QM. Indeed, the truth and falsity of a statement about an individual are traced back to the truth of two universally quantified statements. This implies that a truth value of E(x) is not defined for every E whenever x is in the state S, since it may occur in QM that both the aforesaid universally quantified statements are false for E (in this case E(x) and E ⊥ (x) have no truth value, hence they are meaningless). The existence of meaningless statements implies, in particular, that no Tarskian set-theoretical semantics can be introduced in QM.
The quantum notion of truth and meaning pointed out above is typical of the standard interpretation of QM, and it is inspired by a verificationist position which identifies truth and verifiability, meaning and verifiability conditions. These identifications are rather doubtful from an epistemological viewpoint, yet it is commonly maintained in the literature that the standard quantum conception of truth has no alternatives, since it seems firmly rooted in the formalism of QM itself. The mathematical apparatus of QM would imply indeed the impossibility of defining an assignment function associating a truth value with every individual statement of the form E(x) without contradicting QM. The outcomes obtained in a concrete experiment would depend on the set of observations that are carried out simultaneously, not only on the state of the physical system on which the experiment is performed (contextuality).
Notwithstanding the arguments supporting it, the standard viewpoint can be criticized in our opinion, and an alternative SR interpretation of QM can be constructed based on an epistemological position (semantic realism, or, briefly SR) which allows one to define a truth value for every statement of the form E(x) according to a classical Tarskian set-theoretical model.
(7)−(13) Of course, all statements that are certainly true (certainly false) according to the standard interpretation are also certainly true (certainly false) according to the SR interpretation. The remaining statements are meaningless according to the former interpretation, while they have truth values according to the latter: these values, however, may change when different objects in the same state are considered and cannot be predicted in QM (which is, in this sense, an incomplete theory).
Because of its intuitive, philosophical and technical advantages, we adopt the SR interpretation in the present paper. It is then important to observe that our definitions and reasonings take into account only statements that are certainly true (certainly false) in the sense explained above, hence they actually do not depend on the choice of the interpretation of QM (standard or SR). Thus, our reinterpretation of QL should be acceptable also for logicians and physicists who do not agree with our epistemological position. Of course, if the SR interpretation is not accepted one loses all philosophical advantages of the integrationist perspective mentioned at the beginning of this section.
Let us come now to empirical justification. Whenever a statement E(x) is certainly true (certainly false), its truth (falsity) can be predicted within QM if the property E and the state S are known, and can be checked (by means of nontrivial physical procedures, see Sec. 2.6). Hence, we can say that the assertion of E(x) (E ⊥ (x)) is empirically justified, since we can both deduce the truth of E(x) (E ⊥ (x)) inside QM and provide an empirical proof of it. More formally, one can introduce an assertion sign ⊢ and say that E(x) is certainly true (certainly false) iff ⊢ E(x) (⊢ E ⊥ (x)) is empirically justified. In this way a semantic notion (certainty of truth) is translated into a pragmatic notion (empirical justification). Now, we remind that a pragmatic extension of a classical language and some general properties of the concept of justification have been studied by Dalla Pozza, together with the present author, some years ago, (14) and note that all results obtained in this research apply to the notion of empirical justification introduced above. Moreover, further results can be obtained which are typical of the case under consideration, since the notion of justification is now specified (empirical justification in QM). Thus, a pragmatic language L P Q can be constructed (Sec. 3) in which assertions of the form ⊢ E(x) are taken as elementary assertive formulas (afs) and pragmatic connectives are introduced, for which a set-theoretical pragmatics is defined basing on the concept of empirical justification in QM. This pragmatics defines a justification value for every af of L P Q , yet not all afs of L P Q are pragmatically decidable, i.e., such that an empirical procedure of justification exists (but, of course, it exists for all elementary afs of L P Q ). However, one can single out a subset of pragmatically decidable afs of L P Q and consider a sublanguage L P QD of L P Q which contains only afs in this subset. It is then easy to see that our set-theoretical pragmatics, when restricted to L P QD , endows it with the structure of QL. The above result is highly interesting in our opinion. Indeed, it provides the desired reinterpretation of QL as a theory of the metalinguistic concept of empirical justification in QM, allowing us to place it within an integrationist perspective that avoids any conflict with classical logic (we stress again that this conclusion can be accepted also by scholars who want to maintain the standard interpretation of QM).
We conclude this section observing that our results suggest, in particular, that the standard partition of properties in two subsets (actual properties and potential properties) should be substituted by a partition in three subsets, as follows.
Actual properties. A property E is actual in the state S iff the assertion ⊢ E(x), with x in S, is justified.
Nonactual properties. A property E is nonactual in the state S iff the assertion ⊢ E ⊥ (x), with x in S, is justified. Potential properties. A property E is potential in the state S iff both assertions ⊢ E(x) and ⊢ E ⊥ (x), with x in S, are unjustified.
Physical preliminaries
We introduce in this section a number of symbols, definitions and physical concepts that will be extensively used in Sec. 3 in order to supply an intuitive support and an intended interpretation for the pragmatic language that will be introduced there.
Basic notions and mathematical representations
The following notions will be taken as primitive. Physical system Ω. Pure state S of Ω, and set S of all pure states of Ω (the word pure will be usually implied in the following).
Testable property E of Ω, and set E of all testable properties of Ω (the word testable will be usually implied in the following) 1 States and properties will be interpreted operationally as follows.
1 Properties can be identified with Birkhoff and von Neumann's empirical propositions, which were introduced in the 1936 paper which started the research on QL. (15) It must also be noted that the physical properties considered here are first order properties from a logical viewpoint. (13) Higher order properties obviously occur in physics and will be encountered later on (Sec. 2.6), but they need not be considered here.
A state S ∈ S is a class of physically equivalent 2 preparing devices (briefly, preparations) which may prepare individual samples of Ω (physical objects). A physical object x is in the state S iff it is prepared by a preparation π ∈ S.
A property E ∈ E is a class of physically equivalent ideal dichotomic (outcomes 1, 0) registering devices (briefly, registrations) which may test physical objects.
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The above notions do not distinguish between classical and quantum mechanics. The mathematical representation of physical systems, states and properties are different, however, in the two theories. Let us resume these representations in the case of QM.
Every physical system Ω is associated with a Hilbert space H over the field of complex numbers.
Let us denote by (L(H), ⊂) the partially ordered set (briefly, poset ) of all closed subspaces of H (here ⊂ denotes set-theoretical inclusion), and let A ⊂ L(H) be the set of all one-dimensional subspaces of H. Then (in absence of superselection rules) a mapping ϕ : S ∈ S −→ ϕ(S) ∈ A exists which maps bijectively the set S of all states of Ω onto A, 4 and a mapping
exists which maps bijectively the set E of all properties of Ω onto L(H).
Physical Quantum Logic
The poset (L(H), ⊂) is characterized by a set of mathematical properties. In particular, it is a complete, orthocomplemented, weakly modular, atomic lattice which satisfies the covering law (6) , (16) , (17) . We denote by ⊥ , ⋓ and ⋒ orthocomplementation, meet and join, respectively, in (L(H), ⊂) (it is important to observe that ⋓ coincides with the set-theoretical intersection ∩ of subspaces of L(H), while ⊥ does not generally coincide with the set-theoretical complementation ′ , nor ⋒ coincides with the set-theoretical union ∪). Furthermore, we denote the minimal element {| 0 } and the maximal element H of (L(H), ⊂) by O and I, respectively. Finally, we note that A obviously coincides with the set of all atoms of (L(H), ⊂).
Let us denote by ≺ the order induced on E, via the bijective representation χ, by the order ⊂ defined on L(H). Then, the poset (E, ≺) is order-isomorphic to (L(H), ⊂), hence it is characterized by the same mathematical properties characterizing (L(H), ⊂). In particular, the unary operation induced on it, via χ, by the orthocomplementation defined on (L(H), ⊂), is an orthocomplementation, and (E, ≺) is an orthomodular (i.e., orthocomplemented and weakly modular) lattice, usually called the lattice of properties of Ω. By abuse of language, we denote the lattice operations on (E, ≺) by the same symbols used above in order to denote the corresponding lattice operations on (L(H), ⊂).
Orthomodular lattices are said to characterize semantically orthomodular QLs in the literature.
(2) The lattice of properties is a less general structure in QM, since it inherits a number of further properties from (L(H), ⊂). Therefore, (E, ≺) will be called physical QL in this paper.
Finally, a further lattice, isomorphic to (E, ≺), will be used in the following. In order to introduce it, let us consider the mapping
The range L(S) of ρ obviously is given by L(S) = {S E | E ∈ E}, and generally is a proper subset of the power set P(S) of S. The poset (L(S), ⊂) is order-isomorphic to (L(H), ⊂), hence to (E, ≺), since ϕ and χ are bijective, so that ρ is bijective and order-preserving. Therefore (L(S), ⊂) is characterized by the same mathematical properties characterizing (E, ≺). In particular, the unary operation induced on it, via ρ, by the orthocomplementation defined on (E, ≺), is an orthocomplementation, and (L(S), ⊂) is an orthomodular lattice. We denote orthocomplementation, meet and join on (L(S), ⊂) by the same symbols ⊥ , ⋓, and ⋒, respectively, that we have used in order to denote the corresponding operations on (L(H), ⊂) and (E, ≺), and call (L(S), ⊂) the lattice of closed subsets of S (the word closed refers here to the fact that, for every
We also note that the operation ⋓ coincides with the set-theoretical intersection ∩ on L(S) because of the analogous result holding in (L(H), ⊂).
Actual and potential properties
We say that a property E is actual (nonactual ) for a physical object x in the state S iff one can perform a test of E on x by means of a registration r ∈ E, obtaining outcome 1 (0) without modifying the state S of x.
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Basing on the above definition, for every state S ∈ S three subsets can be introduced.
E S : the set of all properties that are actual for every physical object x in the state S. E ⊥ S : the set of all properties that are nonactual for every physical object x in the state S. 5 One can provide an intuitive support to this definition by noticing that the result obtained in a test of E can be attributed to x in the state S only whenever S is not modified by the test. Moreover, only in this case the test is repeatable, i.e., it can be performed again obtaining the same result.
It is well known that classical physics assumes that tests which do not modify the state S are always possible, at least as ideal limits of concrete procedures, while this assumption does not hold in QM. I S : the set E \E S ∪E ⊥ S (called the set of all properties that are indeterminate, or potential, for every physical object x in the state S).
By using the mathematical apparatus of QM, the sets E S and E ⊥ S can be characterized as follows.
coincides with the set of all properties that have probability 1 (0), according to QM, for every x in the state S, and that the set E I S (which is non-void in QM, while it would be void in classical physics) coincides with the set of all properties that have probability different from 0 and 1 for every x in the state S.
Further characterizations of the above sets can be obtained as follows. (18) Since the mapping ρ is bijective, while every singleton {S}, with S ∈ S, obviously is an atom of L(S), one can associate a property E S = ρ −1 ({S}) (equivalently, E S = χ −1 (ϕ(S))) with every S ∈ S. This property is an atom of (E, ≺), and is usually called the support of S. The mapping ρ −1 thus induces a one-to-one correspondence between (pure) states and atoms of (E, ≺). Then, one can prove the following equalities.
Finally, the following equality also follows from the above definitions. S E = {S ∈ S | E S ≺ E}.
Truth in standard QM
No mention has been done of truth values (true/false) in the foregoing sections. However, we will be concerned with logical structures in Sec. 3, hence it is natural to wonder what QM says about the truth of a sentence as "the physical object x has the property E" (briefly, E(x) in the following).
We have already noted in the Introduction that QM usually avoids making explicit statements regarding individual samples of physical systems. Yet, a sentence as "the property E is actual in the state S" (Sec. 2.3) intuitively means that all physical objects in the state S have the property E. Hence, it can be translated, in terms of truth, into the sentence "for every x in the state S, E(x) is true". If one accepts this translation, QM proves to be concerned also with truth values of individual statements. Moreover, QM more or less implicitly adopts the following verificationist criterion of truth. (18) EV (empirical verificationism). The sentence E(x) has truth value true ( false) for a physical object x in the state S iff E is actual (nonactual) for x, while it is meaningless otherwise.
Criterion EV is obviously at odds with standard definitions in classical logic, and is suggested by the fact that E can be attributed (not attributed) to a physical object x in the state S on the basis of an experimental procedure only when it is actual (nonactual) for x.
Because of the translation above, EV implies the following proposition.
TF. E(x) has truth value true ( false) for a physical object x in the state S iff it has truth value true ( false) for every physical object x in the state S.
Proposition TF explains the definition of truth as certainty, or predictability, which is typical of some approaches to QM.
(5), (6) Furthermore, criterion EV implies that E(x) has a truth value in standard
It is then important to observe that the characterizations of E S and E ⊥ S provided in Sec. 2.3 show that QM allows one to determine, for every S ∈ S, whether a property E belongs to E S ∪ E ⊥ S . In particular, E belongs to E S (E ⊥ S ) iff it has probability 1 (0) for every x in the state S. Hence, one can predict within QM, for every E ∈ E and x in the state S, whether E(x) is true, false or meaningless, which makes standard QM a semantically complete theory. 
Nonobjectivity versus objectivity in QM
The position expounded in Sec. 2.4 about the truth value of sentences of the form E(x), with E ∈ E, is sometimes summarized by saying that physical properties (actually, for every S ∈ S, the properties in E I S ) are nonobjective in standard QM.
Nonobjectivity of properties is supported by a number of arguments. There are arguments based on empirical results (e.g., the famous two-slits argument), arguments following from seemingly reasonable epistemological choices (e.g., the adoption of a verificationist position, together with the indeterminacy principle), technical arguments following from the mathematical structure of QM. These last arguments, in particular, are usually considered conclusive in the literature. We remind here the famous Bell-Kochen-Specker and Bell's theorems (19) − (22) which seem to prove that it is impossible to assign truth values to all sentences of the form E(x), with E ∈ E, without contradicting the predictions of QM.
However, all arguments which show that nonobjectivity of properties is an unavoidable feature of QM can be criticized (this of course does not make the claim of nonobjectivity wrong, but only proves that there are alternatives to it). In particular, one can observe that a no-go theorem, as Bell-Kochen-Specker's, is certainly correct from a mathematical viewpoint, but rests on implicit assumptions that are problematic from a physical and epistemological viewpoint. Basing on this criticism, an alternative interpretation (semantic realism, or SR, interpretation) has been propounded by the author, together with other authors. (8) , (10), (12), (13) As we have already observed in the Introduction, the SR interpretation adopts a correspondence (Tarskian) theory of truth, and all properties are objective according to it (equivalently, the sentence E(x) has a truth value for every physical object x and property E).
The SR interpretation of QM has some definite advantages. Firstly, it makes QM compatible with a realistic perspective without requiring any change of its mathematical apparatus and preserving all statistical predictions following from the standard interpretation, hence it provides a solution of the quantum measurement problem. (13) Secondly, it rests on a classical conception of truth and meaning. Thirdly, it leads one to consider QM as an incomplete theory, (18) and provides some suggestions about the way in which a more general theory embodying QM could be constructed.
There is a result, however, which is basic for our purposes in this paper and holds both in the standard and in the SR interpretation of QM. To be precise, in both interpretations one can predict the truth value of the sentence E(x), whenever x is in the state S, iff E ∈ E S ∪ E ⊥ S (Sec. 2.4). The difference between the two interpretations reduces to the fact that, whenever E ∈ E I S , E(x) is meaningless within the standard interpretation, while it has a truth value that cannot be predicted by QM within the SR interpretation.
Empirical proof in QM
Bearing in mind the result at the end of Sec. 2.5, one can maintain that, whenever x is in the state S, the truth (falsity) of the sentence E(x) can be predicted, hence it is proved, iff E ∈ E S (E ∈ E ⊥ S ). One introduces in this way a concept of proof in QM which is independent of the specific interpretation (standard or SR) that is adopted, and opens the way to a pragmatic interpretation of QL.
The characterizations of E S and E ⊥ S in Sec. 2.3 suggest empirical procedures for verifying the above prediction, hence for proving empirically that a sentence E(x) is true (false) for a physical object x in the state S. Indeed, they show that E ∈ E S (E ∈ E ⊥ S ) iff E S ≺ E (E ≺ E ⊥ S ), or, equivalently, iff S ∈ S E (S ∈ S ⊥ E ). In particular, one can prove empirically that E(x) is true (false) by checking whether the state S of x belongs to the set S E (S ⊥ E ). It is important to note that this check requires a complex empirical procedure, which does not reduce to a test of E on the physical object x, but consists in testing a quantified statement (equivalently, a second order physical property), hence a huge number of physical objects in the state S. (13) Within the standard interpretation of QM the need of a complex procedure can be explained by observing that a single test may actualize the property that is tested, modifying the state of x, so that it does not provide information about the truth of E(x) whenever x is in the state S. It follows from the quantum definition of truth (Sec. 2.4), however, that, according to the standard interpretation, E(x) is true (false) iff it can be proved to be true (false), since it is meaningless whenever no proof of its truth (falsity) can be given. Hence, truth and provability of truth coincide.
Within the SR interpretation of QM the concepts of truth and provability of truth are instead neatly different. A single test of E can then show the contingent truth (falsity) of E(x), while the complex procedure mentioned above shows that E(x) is necessarily true (false) in QM.
QL as a pragmatic language
We aim to show in this section that physical QL can be recovered as a pragmatic language in the sense established in Ref. 14 (briefly, DPG 95 in the following). It is noteworthy that, by weakening slightly the assumptions introduced within DPG 95, one can perform this task without choosing between the two interpretations mentioned at the end of Sec. 2.5. We will adopt however the SR interpretation in this section, since we maintain that the verificationist attitude of the standard interpretation is epistemologically and philosophically doubtful, but we will point out by means of footnotes the simple changes to be introduced in order to attain the same results within the standard interpretation. The alphabet A P of L P contains as descriptive signs the propositional letters p, q, r,...; as logical-semantic signs the connectives , ∧, ∨, → and ↔; as logicalpragmatic signs the assertion sign ⊢ and the connectives N , K, A, C and E; as auxiliary signs the round brackets (.). The set ψ R of all radical formulas (rfs) of L P is made up by all formulas constructed by means of descriptive and logicalsemantic signs, following the standard recursive rules of classical propositional logic (a rf consisting of a propositional letter only is then called atomic). The set ψ A of all assertive formulas (afs) of L P is made up by all rfs preceded by the assertive sign ⊢ (elementary afs), plus all formulas constructed by using elementary afs and following standard recursive rules in which N , K, A, C and E take the place of , ∧, ∨, → and ↔, respectively.
A semantic interpretation of L P is then defined as a pair ({1, 0}, σ), where σ is an assignment function which maps ψ R onto the set {1, 0} of truth values (1 standing for true and 0 for false), following standard truth rules of classical propositional calculus.
Whenever a semantic interpretation σ is given, a pragmatic interpretation of L P is defined as a pair ({J, U }, π σ ), where π σ is a pragmatic evaluation function which maps ψ A onto the set {J, U } of justification values following justification rules which refer to σ and are based on the informal properties of the metalinguistic concept of proof in natural languages. In particular, the following justification rules hold. JR 1 . Let α ∈ ψ R ; then, π σ (⊢ α) = J iff a proof exists that α is true, i.e., that σ(α) = 1 (hence, π σ (⊢ α) = U iff no proof exists that α is true). JR 2 . Let δ ∈ ψ A ; then, π σ (N δ) = J iff a proof exists that δ is unjustified, i.e., that π σ (δ) = U .
Furthermore, the following correctness criterion holds in L P .
CC. Let α ∈ ψ R ; then, π σ (⊢ α) = J implies σ(α) = 1. Finally, the set of all pragmatic evaluation functions that can be associated with a given semantic interpretation σ is denoted by Π σ .
The quantum pragmatic language L P Q
The quantum pragmatic language L P Q that we want to introduce here is obtained by specializing syntax, semantics and pragmatics of L P . Let us begin with the syntax. We introduce the following assumptions on L The substitution in A 1 obviously aims to suggest an intended interpretation according to which the rfs E(x), F (x), ... are metalinguistic symbols to be interpreted on sentences stating that the physical object on which x is interpreted has the properties E, F , ..., respectively (Sec. 2.4). The restriction in A 2 aims to select rfs that are testable from a physical viewpoint, i.e., such that physical procedures exist for testing their truth values (which may not occur in the case of a rf of the form, say, E(x) ∨ F (x); note that a similar restriction has been introduced in DPG 95 when recovering intuitionistic propositional logic within L P ). Finally, the restriction in A 3 is introduced for the sake of simplicity, since only the pragmatic connectives N , K and A are relevant for our goals in this paper.
Because of A 1 , A 2 and A 3 , the set ψ Q A of afs of L P Q is made up by all formulas constructed by means of the following recursive rules.
(i) Let E(x) be a rf. Then ⊢ E(x) is an af.
(ii) Let δ be an af. Then, N δ is an af.
(iii) Let δ 1 and δ 2 be afs. Then, δ 1 Kδ 2 and δ 1 Aδ 2 are afs. Let us come now to the semantics of L P Q . We introduce the following assumption on L P Q . A 4 . Every assignment function σ defined on ψ Q R is induced by an interpretation ξ of the variable x that appears in the rfs into a universe U of physical objects, hence σ = σ(ξ) and the values of σ on ψ Q R are consistent with (not necessarily determined by) the laws of QM.
Let us comment briefly on assumption A 4 . Firstly, we note that the interpretation ξ was understood in Sec. 2.1, when we introduced the concise informal expression "the physical object x is in the state S". Secondly, we observe that the requirement that σ = σ(ξ) be consistent with the laws of QM (briefly, QM-consistent ) obviously follows from the fact that these laws establish relations among the truth values of elementary rfs of L P Q whenever a specific physical object is considered. We denote by Σ in the following the set of all QM-consistent assigment functions.
Thirdly, we note that, since σ = σ(ξ), there may be many interpretations of the variable x that lead to the same assigment function.
Finally, we observe that the universe U can be partitioned into (disjoint) subsets of physical objects, each of which consists of physical objects in the same state (different subsets corresponding to different states). Thus, specifying the state S of x means requiring that the interpretation ξ of x that is considered maps x on a physical object in the subset corresponding to the state S, hence it singles out a subclass Σ S ⊂ Σ of assigment functions. All functions in Σ S assign truth value 1 (0) to a sentence E(x) ∈ ψ Q R whenever E ∈ E S (E ⊥ S ), while the truth values assigned by different functions in Σ S to E(x) may differ if E / ∈ E S ∪ E ⊥ S .
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Let us come now to the pragmatics of L P Q . We introduce the following assumption on L P Q . A 5 . Let a mapping ξ be given which interpretes the variable x in the rfs of L P Q on a physical object in the state S. A proof that the rf E(x) is true (false) consists in performing one of the empirical procedures mentioned in Sec. 2.6 and showing that E ∈ E S ( E ∈ E ⊥ S ). Assumption A 5 is obviously suggested by the intended interpretation discussed above. Taking into account A 1 and JR 1 in Sec. 3.1, it implies the following statement.
P. Let E(x) be a rf of L P Q , let ξ be an interpretation of the variable x on a physical object in the state S, and let S E be defined as in Sec. 2.2. Then,
The above result specifies π σ(ξ) on the set of all elementary afs of L P Q and shows that it depends only on the state S. Hence, we write π S in place of π σ(ξ) in the following (for the sake of brevity, we also agree to use the intuitive statement "the physical object x is in the state S" introduced in Sec. 2.1 in place of the more rigorous statement "the variable x is interpreted on a physical object in the state S").
Statement P provides the starting point for introducing a set-theoretical pragmatics for L P Q , as follows. Firstly, we introduce a mapping f : δ ∈ ψ Q A −→ S δ ∈ P(S) 6 Note that A 4 can be stated unchanged whenever the standard interpretation of QM is adopted instead of the SR interpretation. In this case, however, for every ξ, σ(ξ) is defined only on a subset of rfs, not on the whole ψ Q R , and Σ S reduces to a singleton. Indeed, for every interpretation ξ, a state S = S(ξ) exists such that ξ(x) ∈ S. Then, σ(ξ) is defined on a rf E(x) iff E ∈ E S ∪ E ⊥ S (Sec. 2.5), and does not change if ξ is substituted by an interpretation
which associates a pragmatic extension S δ with every assertive formula δ ∈ ψ Q A , defined by means of the following recursive rules.
(
Secondly, we rewrite statement P above substituting S ⊢E(x) to S E in it, as follows.
be an elementary af of L P Q and let x be in the state S. Then,
Thirdly, we note that statement P ′ defines the pragmatic evaluation function π S on all elementary afs of L (
The above procedure defines, for every S ∈ S, a pragmatic evaluation function π S : δ ∈ ψ Q A −→ π S (δ) ∈ {J, U } which provides a set-theoretical pragmatics for L P Q , as stated.
On the notion of justification in L P Q
The notion of justification introduced in Sec. 3.2 is basic in our approach and must be clearly understood. To this end, we devote this section to comment on it.
Whenever an elementary af ⊢ E(x) of L P Q is considered, the notion of justification obviously coincides with the notion of existence of an empirical proof of the truth of E(x) because of A 5 and R in Sec. 3.2, which fits in with JR 1 in Sec. 3.1.
Whenever molecular afs of L P are considered, one can grasp intuitively the meaning of the notion of justification for them by considering simple instances. Indeed, let E(x) be a rf and let x be in the state S. We get π S (N ⊢ E(x)) = J iff S ∈ S ⊥ E , which means, shortly, that it is justified to assert that E(x) cannot be asserted iff MQ entails that the truth value of E(x) is false for every x in the state S. This result, of course, fits in with JR 2 in Sec. 3.1.
Furthermore, let E(x) and F (x) be rfs, and let x be in the state S. We get
The first equality shows, shortly, that asserting E(x) and F (x) conjointly is justified iff both assertions are justified. The second equality shows that asserting E(x) or asserting F (x) is justified iff one of these assertions is justified. Both these results, of course, fit in with JR 3 in Sec. 3.1.
We add that
, which shows that a tertium non datur principle does not hold for the pragmatic connective N in L P Q (it has already been proved in DPG 95 that this principle does not hold in the general language L P ). It is also interesting to note that the justification value of different elementary afs, say ⊢ E(x) and ⊢ F (x), must be different for some state S, since
Finally, we remind that the general theory of L P associates an assignment function σ with a set Π σ of pragmatic evaluation functions (Sec. 3.1), hence this also occurs within L P Q . One may then wonder whether Π σ is necessarily nonvoid and, if this is the case, whether it may contain more than one pragmatic evaluation function. In order to answer these questions, let us consider an interpretation ξ of the variable x that maps x on a physical object in the state S. Then, ξ determines a unique assignment function σ(ξ) and a unique pragmatic evaluation function associated with it, that we have denoted by π S , for it depends only on the state S. Since every assigment function in Σ is induced by an interpretation ξ because of A 4 in Sec. 3.2, this proves that Π σ is necessarily nonvoid for every σ ∈ Σ. Moreover, note that an interpretation ξ ′ of x may exist within the SR interpretation of QM that maps x on a physical object in the state S ′ , with S ′ = S, yet such that σ(ξ ′ ) = σ(ξ). The pragmatic evaluation functions π S and π S ′ are then different, but they are both associated with the assignment function σ = σ(ξ) = σ(ξ ′ ), so that they both belong to Π σ . Hence, Π σ may contain many pragmatic evaluation functions. Coming back to the general language L P , we remind that a notion of pragmatic validity (invalidity) is introduced in it by means of the following definition. 7 The assumption A 5 in Sec. 3.2 can be stated unchanged whenever the standard interpretation of QM is adopted instead of the SR interpretation. In this case, however, it is impossible that a mapping ξ ′ exists such that ξ ′ (x) ∈ S ′ , with S = S ′ and σ(ξ) = σ(ξ ′ ), since σ(ξ) and σ(ξ ′ ) are defined on different domains (E S ∪ E ⊥ S and E S ′ ∪ E ⊥ S ′ , respectively). Hence, an assigment function σ is associated with a unique state S, and Πσ reduces to the singleton {π S }. Let δ ∈ ψ A . Then, δ is pragmatically valid, or p-valid ( pragmatically invalid, or p-invalid) iff for every σ ∈ Σ and π σ ∈ Π σ , π σ (δ) = J ( π σ (δ) = U ).
By using the notions of justification in L P Q , one can translate the notion of p-validity (p-invalidity) within L P Q as follows.
The notion of p-validity (p-invalidity) can then be characterized as follows.
The set of all p-valid afs plays in L P Q a role similar to the role of tautologies in classical logic, and some afs in it can be selected as axioms if one tries to construct a p-correct and p-complete calculus for L P Q . We will not deal, however, with this topic in the present paper.
Furthermore, let us observe that a binary relation can be introduced in the general language L P by means of the following definition.
For every δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ ψ A , δ 1 ≺ δ 2 iff a proof exists that δ 2 is justified whenever δ 1 is justified (equivalently, δ 1 ≺ δ 2 iff δ 1 Cδ 2 is justified ).
The set-theoretical pragmatics introduced in Sec. 3.2 allows one to translate the above definition in L P Q as follows.
The binary relation ≺ can then be characterized as follows.
The relation ≺ is obviously a pre-order relation on ψ Q A , hence it induces canonically an equivalence relation ≈ on ψ Q A , defined as follows. For every δ 1 , δ 2 ∈ ψ Q A , δ 1 ≈ δ 2 iff δ 1 ≺ δ 2 and δ 2 ≺ δ 1 . The equivalence relation ≈ can then be characterized as follows.
Decidability versus justifiability in L P Q
We have commented rather extensively in Sec. 3.3 on the notion of justification formalized in L P Q , for every S ∈ S, by the pragmatic evaluation function π S . It must still be noted, however, that the definition of π S on all afs in ψ Q A does not grant that an empirical procedure of proof exists which allows one to establish, for every S ∈ S, the justification value of every af of L P Q . In order to understand how this may occur, note that the notion of empirical proof is defined by A 5 for atomic rfs of L P Q and makes explicit reference, for every E(x) ∈ ψ Q R , to the closed subset S E ∈ L(S) associated with E by the function ρ introduced in Sec. 2.2. Basing on this notion, the justification value π S (⊢ E(x)) of an elementary af ⊢ E(x) ∈ ψ Q A can be determined by means of the same empirical procedure, making reference to the closed subset S ⊢E(x) = S E associated to ⊢ E(x) by the function f (Sec. 3.2). Yet, whenever π S is recursively defined on the whole ψ Q A , new subsets of states are introduced (as S δ1 ∪ S δ2 ) which may not belong to L(S). If an af δ is associated with a subset of this kind by f , no empirical procedure exists in QM which allows one to determine the justification value π S (δ).
We are thus led to introduce the subset ψ
Q is p-decidable iff an empirical procedure of proof exists which allows one to establish whether δ is justified or unjustified, whatever the state S of x may be.
Because of the remark above, the subset of all p-decidable afs of L P Q can be characterized as follows.
Let us discuss some criteria for establishing whether a given af δ ∈ ψ 
It is apparent from criteria C 2 and C 3 that ψ Q AD is closed with respect to the pragmatic connectives N and K, in the sense that δ ∈ ψ 3.6 The p-decidable sublanguage L
P QD
As we have anticipated in the Introduction, we aim to show in this paper that the sublanguage L P QD has the structure of a physical QL, hence it provides a new pragmatic interpretation of this relevant physical structure. However, this interpretation will be more satisfactory from an intuitive viewpoint if we endow L P QD with some further derived pragmatic connectives which can be made to correspond with connectives of physical QL. To this end, we introduce the following definitions. D 1 . We call quantum pragmatic disjunction the connective A Q defined as follows.
For every
We call quantum pragmatic implication the connective I Q defined as follows.
. Let us discuss the justification rules which hold for afs in which the new connectives A Q and I Q occur.
By using the function f introduced in Sec. 3.2 we get (since the settheoretical operation ∩ coincides with the lattice operation ⋓ in (L(S), ⊂), see Sec. 2.2),
Hence, for every S ∈ S,
Let us come to the quantum pragmatic implication I Q . By using the definition of A Q , one gets
Furthermore, by using the function f and the above result about A Q , one gets
Let us observe now that L P QD obviously inherits the notions of p-validity and order defined in L P Q (Sec. 3.4). Hence, we can illustrate the role of the connective I Q within L P QD by means of the following pragmatic deduction lemma.
Proof. The following sequence of equivalences holds. For every S ∈ S, π S (δ 1 I Q δ 2 ) = J iff for every S ∈ S, S ∈ S
PDL shows indeed that the quantum pragmatic implication I Q plays within L P QD a role similar to the role of material implication in classical logic.
Interpreting QL onto L P QD
In order to show that the physical QL (E, ≺) introduced in Sec. 2.2 can be interpreted into L P QD , a further preliminary step is needed. To be precise, let us make reference to the preorder introduced on ψ 
This mapping is obviously well defined because of the characterization of ≈ in Sec. 3.4. Furthermore, the following statements hold.
(i) For every δ ∈ φ Q AD , one and only one elementary af ⊢ E(x) exists such
(ii) The mapping f ≈ is bijective.
Since S δ ∈ L(S) and ρ is bijective (Sec. 2.2), a property E ∈ E exists such that E = ρ −1 (S δ ). Hence, [δ] ≈ contains the af ⊢ E(x) since S ⊢E(x) = S E (Sec. Let us come now to physical QL. We have seen in Sec. 2.2 that (L(S), ⊂) is order-isomorphic to (E, ≺). We can then conclude that (E, ≺) is orderisomorphic to (φ Q AD / ≈, ≺), which provides the desired interpretation of a physical QL into L P QD . Let us comment briefly on the pragmatic interpretation of physical QL provided above.
Firstly, we note that our interpretation maps E on the quotient set φ Q AD / ≈, not onto φ Q AD . Yet, the set of the (well formed) formulas of the lattice (E, ⊥ , ⋓, ⋒) can be mapped bijectively onto φ Q AD by means of the mapping induced by the following formal correspondence.
Moreover, the above correspondence makes I Q correspond to a Sasaki projection, the role of which is well known in QL (17) . Secondly, we stress that our interpretation is relevant from a philosophical viewpoint, since it avoids all problems following from the standard concept of quantum truth (Sec. 2.4) considering physical QL as characterizing a quantum concept of justification rather than a quantum concept of truth. This makes physical QL consistent also with the classical concept of truth adopted with the SR interpretation of QM (Sec. 2.5). Furthermore, as we have already observed in the Introduction, it places physical QL within a general integrationist perspective, according to which non-Tarskian theories of truth can be integrated with Tarski's theory by reinterpreting them as theories of metalinguistic concepts that are different from truth (in the case of physical QL, the concept of empirical justification in QM).
Finally, our interpretation has some consequences that are intuitively satisfactory. For instance, for every state S ∈ S, it attributes a justification value to every af in φ Q AD , while it is well known that there are formulas in physical QL which have no truth value according to the standard interpretation of QL (Sec. 2.4).
Some remarks on a possible calculus for L P QD
One may obviously wonder whether a calculus can be given for the language L P QD which is pragmatically correct (p-correct ) and pragmatically complete (pcomplete). This is not a difficult task if we limit ourselves to the general lattice structure of (φ Q AD / ≈, ≺). Indeed, a set of axioms and/or inference rules which endow φ Q AD / ≈ of the structure of orthomodular lattice can be easily obtained by using the formal correspondence introduced in Sec. 3.7, since this correspondence allows one to translate the axioms and/or inference rules that are usually stated in order to provide a calculus for orthomodular QL into φ However, in order to obtain physical QL one needs a number of further axioms, since the structure of (L(H), ⊂) must be recovered (Sec. 2.2). Providing a complete calculus for such a structure is a much more complicate task, which must take into account a number of mathematical results in lattice theory (in particular, Soler's theorem (23) ). Therefore we will not discuss this problem in the present paper.
